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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5162
The global financial crisis has already led to sharp 
downturns in the developing world. In the past, 
international aid has been able to offset partially the 
effects of crises that began in the developing world, but 
because this crisis began in the wealthy countries, donors 
may be less willing or able to increase aid in this crisis. 
Not only have donor-country incomes fallen, but the 
cause of the drop—the banking and financial-sector 
crisis—may exacerbate the effect on aid flows because of 
its heavy fiscal costs. This paper estimates how donor-
country banking crises have affected aid flows in the past, 
using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 
and 2007. The analysis finds that banking crises in donor 
countries are associated with a substantial additional fall 
in aid flows, beyond any income-related effects, perhaps 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to determine how aid can more effectively promote development.. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The corresponding author may be contacted 
at hrogers@worldbank.org. 
because of the high fiscal costs of crisis and the debt 
hangover in the post-crisis periods. In most specifications, 
aid flows from crisis-affected countries fall by an average 
of 20 to 25 percent (relative to the counterfactual) and 
bottom out only about a decade after the banking crisis 
hits. In addition, the results confirm that donor-country 
incomes are robustly related to per-capita aid flows, with 
an elasticity of about 3. Because all donor countries are 
being hit hard by the current global recession, and several 
have also suffered banking-sector crises, there are reasons 
to expect that aid could fall by a significant amount 
(again, relative to the counterfactual) in the coming 
years—just when aid may be most clearly justified to help 
smooth exogenous shocks to developing countries.  
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1. Introduction: Financial crises, economic downturns, and aid outflows 
This paper investigates how financial crises and economic conditions in donor countries have 
affected flows of international aid in the past, with the aim of understanding how the current global 
financial crisis could affect future flows.  We do this by using fixed-effects regressions on a 24-
nation panel dataset covering 1977-2007 to estimate the effects of banking crises and other 
economic and political variables on aid.   Consistent with other research, we find that donor-country 
income levels are strong predictors of aid flows, suggesting that a recession that has driven incomes 
well below their trend could substantially reduce aid in the years to come.  Our main contribution is 
to estimate the effects of donor-country banking crises on aid.  These effects turn out to be large, 
significant, and surprisingly long-lived, with aid from crisis-stricken countries falling relative to the 
counterfactual by 20 to 25 percent even 10 years after the banking crisis hits.  Moreover, because 
they are estimated in regressions that control for donor-country per-capita income, these banking-
crisis effects are additional to those of the economic downturns that coincide with the banking 
crises.   
Aid and economic slowdowns in donor countries 
In recent past crises that have hit the developing world, development finance has helped to cushion 
the effects of private capital flow reversals and economic decline.  During the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98, for example, multilateral and bilateral donors provided almost $100 billion in loans 
and grants to the crisis-afflicted countries (International Monetary Fund 1998).  While some of this 
lending was ostensibly at market rates (as in the case of IBRD lending from the World Bank) and 
therefore would not count as official development assistance (ODA), in practice even these loans 
had a substantial subsidy component in a crisis in which private finance had largely dried up.  
Official development flows were also crucial in helping Mexico to rebound from its 1994-95 crisis, 
for example.   
But the current crisis has brought new and perhaps unparalleled stresses to the developing world.  
Unlike most recent past crises, which have primarily affected one developing region (such as East 
Asia or Latin America) or group (such as major emerging markets), this one has affected all regions.  
In 2009, growth is expected to be nearly 7 percentage points lower for the developing and emerging 
economies as a group than it was in 2007, with the drop exceeding 4 percentage points in every   3
region (International Monetary Fund 2009c).  This means that any international aid to cushion the 
effects of the downturn has to be shared across a larger number of countries and regions than in 
past crises.   
And it is not only the per-recipient flows that could fall; there is also a risk that aggregate aid budgets 
could come under strain.  A key difference from the East Asian and Tequila crises of the 1990s is 
that both of those took place at a time of sustained growth in donor countries.  This time, it is the 
donor countries that have been hit first by the financial crisis, and GDP is projected to decline 3.8 
percent in 2009 for rich countries as a group (International Monetary Fund 2009c).  Donors’ 
willingness to give aid could decline, just when the need for aid will be greater.  In times of 
economic slowdown, donor-country policymakers are likely to be pressed to redirect aid funds to 
domestic needs such as unemployment benefits and emergency infrastructure programs.  There may 
be political pressure to reduce aid budgets, or at a minimum to postpone or eliminate planned 
increases in aid.  Recent research, for example, finds that higher levels of financial insecurity in 
donor countries are associated with weaker voter support for foreign aid (Paxton and Knack 2008).   
What do we know empirically about the sensitivity of aid flows to donor-country economic and 
financial conditions?  While there is an established literature that examines how recipient-country 
characteristics – such as income level, population, and political system – affect aid inflows (see, for 
example, Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Levin 2006), much less is known about these donor-side 
determinants of aid.  Several recent papers have begun to fill this gap, mostly using panel data with 
donor fixed effects.  Aid is positively associated with income per capita in most of these studies 
(Round and Odedokun 2004; Boschini and Olofsgard 2007; Chong and Gradstein 2008), although 
one finds no significant relation (Faini 2006).  Faini finds aid is lower when budget deficits and the 
stock of public debt are higher, but others find no significant relationship between deficits and aid 
provision (Round and Odedokun 2004; Boschini and Olofsgard 2007).  None of these studies 
explore the impact of financial crises in donor countries on aid provision, although two recent 
studies (discussed below) do. 
The possible exacerbating effects of donor-country banking crises 
Not all economic slowdowns are created equal, and it is possible that the nature and causes of any 
particular slowdown may influence its effects on aid flows.  Roodman (2008) shows graphically that   4
several OECD donor countries – Finland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden –  reduced their aid flows 
substantially after they suffered domestic banking crises in the 1990s.  Although Roodman does not 
provide further analysis, there are reasons to believe that banking crises could have direct effects on 
aid beyond their effects on incomes.
2  Bank rescues and recapitalizations place massive new fiscal 
demands on the public sector; even if the government is eventually able to recoup many of the costs 
of these rescues through asset sales, the short-term effect is to worsen sharply the government’s 
cash flow.  In their comprehensive analysis of systemic banking crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
estimate that fiscal costs of banking crisis management, even net of recoveries from asset sales, 
average more than 13 percent of GDP.  For the advanced economies, the fiscal cost has typically 
been less than that – perhaps 3 to 5 percent of GDP (in gross terms) – but Finland is estimated to 
have spent 12.8 percent of GDP to resolve its banking crisis in the early 1990s.  With these 
additional costs added to the usual cyclical revenue shortfalls from recession, donors may find it 
more difficult to continue giving aid during and after those crises than they would in a normal 
downturn of the same magnitude.   
This direct banking-crisis effect may be particularly relevant for aggregate aid flows in the current 
crisis, for two reasons.  First, two of the largest donors (in absolute terms), the United States and 
United Kingdom, were the major economies whose banking sectors were hit by systemic crises in 
2007.  Second, the banking sectors in other major donor countries have also suffered, even if few are 
likely to be classified as having entered systemic crises.  Two other new papers try to estimate the 
impact of donor-country financial-sector troubles on aid provision.  Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara 
(2009) use 1967-2007 data for the U.S. only and show that stock market volatility, which they call “a 
proxy for financial volatility and economic uncertainty,” is associated with reduced ODA.  The other 
new study is more directly parallel to this one:  Frot (2009) uses data for a panel of donors for the 
1986-96 period to estimate how financial crises affect aid flows.  He finds that a banking crisis in a 
donor country decreases aid by 13 percent (when estimated as a level effect) or that aid falls by 5  
percent per year after the onset of a crisis (when estimated in trends).   Frot also estimates the 
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impact of GDP, unemployment and budget deficits on aid, using a vector autoregression (VAR) 
model.    
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that banking crises have dampening effects on aid, 
independent of their effects on per capita income in donor countries.  Our analysis differs in several 
respects from Frot (2009), most notably in covering a much longer time period with more banking 
crises.   
The methodology and data are described in the following section, and results for overall ODA 
volumes are presented in section 3.  We explore more tentatively the impact of banking crises on the 
composition of aid in section 4.  The final section considers the implications of these findings for 
the coming years.   
2. Methodology and data 
Methodology 
Our general approach is to estimate some version of the following equation: 
Aid it = α banking crisis it + β X it + γ Z it + μi + ηt + ε it    , 
where i indexes the donor country and Aid it is overall aid from the country.  As our primary 
dependent variable, we use the log of net ODA disbursements in constant (2007) dollars.
3  Banking 
crisis it, the primary variable of interest, captures whether the country has recently been hit by a 
banking crisis (with crises coded as described in the next section).  X it is a vector of two time-
varying control variables:  per-capita GDP and population.  These variables are included in virtually 
all studies of aid determinants, either individually or combined as total GDP, and so we include 
them in all of our specifications.  Given the heterogeneity among countries and the likely importance 
of unobservables correlated with the error term in determining aid flows, we use donor fixed effects 
(μi) to capture time-invariant country-specific influences on aid provision.  Coefficient estimates for 
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the X it are therefore informed only by within-country variation over time.  In all specifications we 
include year dummies (ηt) to account for common shocks to aid volumes in any given year.   
The vector Z it represents a set of other plausible time-varying control variables, most of which have 
been included in one or more studies in the literature; these variables have typically not been shown 
to be robustly significant, but we use them in our robustness tests.
4  The economic control variables 
from the literature include fiscal budget surplus (Round and Odedokun 2004; Faini 2006; Boschini 
and Olofsgard 2007; Frot 2009), unemployment (Boschini and Olofsgard 2007; Frot 2009; 
Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara 2009), inflation (Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara 2009), and trade 
integration (Boschini and Olofsgard 2007); we add to this list government expenditures and real 
exchange rates.  The political variables include inequality (Boschini and Olofsgard 2007; Chong and 
Gradstein 2008; Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara 2009), corruption (Chong and Gradstein 2008), and 
political orientation of the governing party (Round and Odedokun 2004; Boschini and Olofsgard 
2007; Chong and Gradstein 2008; Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara 2009).   
In all regressions, we report results using standard errors clustered at the country level, to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and within-panel serial correlation. Using conventional standard errors yields 
much higher levels of significance, and could be equally valid given the small number of countries 
(Wooldridge 2002, 275-76).   However, we use the corrected standard errors to be more 
conservative.      
Aid data 
Data for our main test are taken from the OECD-DAC database, which is the standard source used 
in the literature, and cover the period from 1977 through 2007.  In the empirical work reported 
below, we follow most other studies in using data on net aid disbursements rather than aid 
commitments.  There is typically a wide gap between commitments and disbursements, and 
ultimately it is the disbursements of aid – and not the higher committed amounts – that matter to 
the recipient countries.        
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We also test the robustness of our findings by re-running our estimations using two other measures 
of disbursements, in addition to net disbursements.  The first alternative is gross disbursements, 
which measures only total disbursements and does not net out repayments of loan principal.  The 
second alternative measure of aid is Net Aid Transfers (NAT), using data made available by the 
Center for Global Development and described in Roodman (2006 and 2009).   NAT subtracts out 
not only repayments of principal but also interest payments and cancellation of non-ODA loans (aka 
“debt relief”).  Thus NAT more closely approximates the current budgetary outlays associated with 
ODA. 
Our sample covers 24 donor countries during the 1977-2007 period.  (For a list, see Appendix Table 
1.) For 19 of these countries, aid data are available for the entire 31-year period.  For the other five, 
which became donors after 1977, the period of coverage is between 17 and 28 years.  We omitted 
several new donors that began reporting aid data to the DAC only in the late 1990s.
5  Most of these 
are transition economies also dropped by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache from their recent 
banking-crisis analysis (2005: 71) because “[banking] problems in these countries were of a special 
nature.”     
Data on banking crises 
Our primary source on banking crises is the comprehensive new database assembled by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) covering 1970-2007.  This dataset includes only systemic crises, which Laeven and 
Valencia define as those in which “a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large 
number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying 
contracts on time.”  The authors note that they thereby “exclude banking system distress events that 
affected isolated banks but were not systemic in nature”.  Between 1977 and 2007, according to this 
dataset, banking crises struck 9 of the 24 donor countries in our dataset:   Finland, Japan, Korea, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Because Turkey and 
the U.S. each had two banking crises, there were a total of 11 systemic crises among our DAC 
donors over that period.  Laeven and Valencia’s dataset (hereafter “LV”) provides the year in which 
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each crisis started; unlike earlier databases, it does not provide end years, perhaps because the end of 
the crisis is usually much less clear-cut than its onset.  (See Appendix Table 1 for a list of crisis onset 
years.) 
As a secondary source of crisis data, we use an earlier dataset compiled by Caprio, Klingebiel, 
Laeven, and Noguera (2005).  Although less recent than LV, the Caprio et al. database (hereafter 
“CKLN”) is a useful complement to LV in two ways.  First, it provides estimated end years for each 
crisis, allowing us to test whether effects on aid are larger during or after a crisis.  Second, it includes 
both systemic and non-systemic banking crises, allowing tests of how the effects on aid vary with the 
extent of the crisis.  Counting both types of crisis, CKLN identifies 23 crises in 17 of the DAC 
donor countries in our dataset.  The systemic crises identified by CKLN generally match those of 
LV, with the main exception being the start date of the crisis in Japan.  We have updated CKLN 
from its end date of 2002 through 2007, to match the LV year coverage.  This entailed adding the 
only two crises that LV identifies as having begun since 2002 in the donor countries – the current 
banking crises in the US and UK, which LV codes as beginning in 2007.  It also required specifying 
an end date for Japan’s crisis; we use 2006, but our CKLN results are qualitatively robust to 
assuming that it ended in 2005 or 2007 instead.   
Data on income, population, and other control variables 
For per-capita income, population, and the other control variables in Zit, we use data from a variety 
of sources, including the World Development Indicator database (World Bank 2009), World 
Development Reports (World Bank, various years), World Economic Outlook (IMF 2009),  
Luxembourg Income Study project (2009), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 2009), 
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. (2001); updated 2008). Appendix Table 2 provides a 
detailed list of variables and sources for the data we use in this paper.  
3. Results: Donor-country financial, economic, and political characteristics and ODA 
Do donors give less aid after suffering banking crises?  Figure 1 gives a straightforward first-cut 
answer to that question, by comparing aid flows for crisis and non-crisis countries before and after a   9
crisis hits.
6  Crisis countries are defined as those that suffered any systemic banking crisis during 
1977-2007, according to the LV definition; non-crisis countries are those that did not.  For the crisis 
group, the figure shows the indexed unweighted mean of the indices of aid volumes (in real dollars) 
before and after the onset of the crisis, with the first year of each crisis synchronized to t=1.  For 
example, year 1 refers to 1991 in Finland, 1997 in Japan, and 1988 in the United States.  For non-
crisis countries, we take the mean of aid levels from t-10 to t+15 for each of the different crisis years 
t=1, then take the mean of those means to come up with the non-crisis trend line shown in the 
figure.  Aid levels are indexed to 100 for year t=0 for both crisis and non-crisis countries.  The crisis 
countries include only those for which aid data are available both before and after the crisis hit (e.g., 
not Spain, Turkey, and the UK), to ensure a reliable comparison.
7 
Figure 1a shows clearly a correlation between banking crises and subsequent declines in (relative) aid 
flows.  For years t-10 through year t, aid from crisis countries follows roughly the same upward 
trends as non-crisis countries.  After the crisis hits, in years t+1 through t+15, aid from the crisis 
countries stagnates, bottoming out in relative terms only after a decade of declines that cumulatively 
drive aid at least 30 percent below the levels in non-crisis countries.  By contrast, aid from non-crisis 
countries on average continues on roughly the same upward trend as before the crisis.   
This post-crisis gap in aid flows is even larger and clearer if we omit Korea from the list of crisis 
countries (Figure 1b).  In some ways Korea is a special case, because it is a less mature donor during 
this period than the other crisis countries (Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the US).  Its aid 
started from a relatively low base and grew rapidly through much of this period as Korea sought a 
stronger role on the global stage.  The countries going through banking crises this time around – 
Ireland, the UK, and the US – are arguably much more like the other mature donors that are 
depicted in Figure 1b.  These countries show an average absolute drop in real aid over the first 
decade after the crisis hits, and a growing relative gap with non-crisis countries over that whole 
period.   
                                                 
6 The figure thus generalizes and averages the individual country crisis-aid relationships shown by Roodman (2008) in his 
original post on this issue.   
7 The inclusion of country fixed effects in the regressions reported below accomplishes the same purpose without 
dropping these countries.   10
Of course, these drops in aid from crisis countries could reflect other factors – most obviously, the 
fall in per-capita income that tends to accompany crises.  The rest of this section therefore explores 
this result econometrically, to add income and other control variables and to account for country 
fixed effects and common shocks.   
Table 1 shows our core results on banking crises and aid for the full 1977-2007 period and the full 
set of donor countries.  We first discuss the banking-crisis variables, before returning below to the 
effects of donor-country incomes and populations.   
Banking crises:  Effects on aid during and after the crisis 
Banking crises emerge as a strong predictor of lower aid, using a variety of different measures of aid 
disbursements (see Table 1).  We capture the crisis effects using a counter variable that records the 
number of years since a banking crisis hit, with the first year of the crisis taking a value of 1.  To 
allow the effect to diminish over time, we include the counter in both linear and square terms; both 
turn out to be highly significant, and the magnitudes are large.  The results for net aid disbursements 
(column 1) imply that five years after a crisis hits, aid is 17 percent lower than it would have been in 
the absence of a crisis.  Perhaps surprisingly, at that point aid is still declining relative to the no-crisis 
counterfactual.  It does not bottom out until 10 or 11 years after the crisis hits, at which point aid is 
down 24 percent. 
This banking-crisis effect does not vary much with different measures of aid, as shown in columns 2 
and 3.  For both gross disbursements and net aid transfers, the point estimates of the effects are very 
similar to the estimates for net disbursements (although the significance of the coefficients declines 
somewhat in column 3).   
An alternative way to measure the crisis effects is to enter dummies for year intervals after the crisis 
hits (column 4).  These regression intervals are derived from Figure 2, which depicts graphically the 
coefficient estimates for an exhaustive set of individual-year post-crisis dummy variables constructed 
from the counter variable.  Most of these dummies are not individually statistically significant (even 
when their coefficients are large), but they are useful for identifying a smaller set of dummies that 
group years without losing too much information in the data.     11
Based on the pattern exhibited in Figure 2, we differentiate among three intervals:  years 1-6 after 
the start of the crisis, years 7-13, and years 14 and above.  Consistent with the quadratic results in 
equation 2, we find the strongest effects in the middle interval.  Whereas the first six years of the 
crisis do not have any significant effects on disbursements, in years 7 to 13 disbursements are down 
by an average of some 30 percent (significant at the 10 percent level).  But while the effect is very 
long-lasting, it is not permanent:  the dummy for the last period, 14 years and beyond, is not 
significantly negative in any of the tests reported in Table 1.   
Banking crisis effects:  Robustness to changes in crisis countries and years 
These estimates are based on a number of assumptions about financial crises – most notably, when 
they started and whether they were systemic or not.  Table 2 shows the results of reversing some of 
these assumptions (one at a time, so as not to shrink the sample too much), and checks the 
robustness of results to dropping potentially influential cases.  We use the model specification of 
Table 1, equation 1, but to conserve space report in Table 2 only the banking crisis coefficients for 
comparison.   
In every case, the crisis coefficient estimates are consistent with those reported in Table 1.  The first 
row shows that the results are not sensitive to dropping a very small donor (Iceland) rather than 
giving it equal weight.  Row 2 instead drops Finland, shown by Roodman (2008) to have the deepest 
post-crisis trough in aid among the four cases he examined.  Korea is the donor dropped in row 3.  
It became a donor only in 1990, and its aid exhibits substantial volatility around an overall upward 
trend, and with a banking crisis beginning in 1997.  Dropping Korea strengthens the negative impact 
of crises somewhat.   
In row 4, we change the onset date of Japan’s banking crisis from 1997 (Laeven and Valencia’s 
preferred year) to 1992, right after the Japanese asset bubbles burst (CKLN’s view).  In row 5, we 
examine how results are affected by re-coding the U.S. as having no banking crisis until 2007.  
Although LV includes the U.S. savings and loan crisis beginning in 1988 as systemic, CKLN codes it 
as non-systemic.  Results in rows 4 and 5 show that the estimated impacts of banking crises on aid 
are fairly insensitive to these judgments on crises in the U.S. and Japan.    12
In row 6, we omit Spain, because its crisis was already underway when it became a donor in 1980, so 
that we have no pre-crisis “normal” data for that country.  Also, as the donor with the earliest 
banking crisis, Spain is also potentially a very influential case in estimating when the dampening 
effects on aid eventually end or reverse.  But omitting Spain does not reduce the coefficients at all.  
Our counter variable applies only to one crisis per country, so in row 7 we drop Turkey, which had 
crises beginning in 1982 and again in 2000.  Turkey's 1982 crisis, like Spain's in 1975, is also 
potentially very influential in estimating the longer-term impact on aid.  Like Korea, Turkey is also a 
new donor with large fluctuations around an overall upward trend in aid.  Results prove however 
not to be sensitive to Turkey's inclusion.   
In row 8, we drop observations from the onset of a second crisis.  Specifically, we drop Turkey's 
observations for 2000-2007, and the U.S. observation for 2007.  Including those years in the sample 
but ignoring the second crisis can be viewed as measurement error potentially affecting results for 
our crisis variables.  Results in row 8 differ only trivially, however, from those in Table 1.  In an 
alternative test, in row 9, we retain all observations for Turkey and the U.S., but add a second set of 
dummy variables (shown in the last two table columns) defined with respect to their second crises.  
Results for the first-crisis variables are unaffected.  Aid does not drop significantly with the onset of 
a second crisis, an unsurprising finding given the small number of observations in our data 
corresponding to second crises. 
Finally in row 10 we net out aid that takes the form of contributions to multilateral aid institutions.  
These contributions reflect multiyear agreements among donor countries that might be more 
difficult than many bilateral aid programs to reduce quickly when adverse economic conditions arise.  
Results in row 10 are not affected much by this change, however, and the negative impact on aid is 
still fully realized only about 10 years after onset of the crisis.        
In Table 3, we exploit the CKLN data on crisis end dates (in equations 1 and 2) and non-systemic 
crises (in equations 3 and 4), neither of which are coded in LV.  Results in this table corroborate the 
major finding from Table 1 of large and long-lived effects on aid disbursements.  The crisis ending 
dates allow us to test impacts on aid both during the crisis and afterward.  For example, the impact 
in year t+5 of a crisis that began in year t is potentially larger if the crisis is still ongoing than if it has 
ended.  In equation 1, we drop the 42 country-year observations with ongoing crises.  Coefficients   13
on the banking crisis variables change only trivially compared to the full sample in Table 1.  In 
equation 2, we retain all observations but add two variables: number of years and number of years 
squared from the onset of an ongoing crisis, i.e. they equal 0 for all years subsequent to the crisis end 
year.  Again, results on the original set of banking crisis variables are changed only trivially, and 
coefficients for the added set are insignificant, and far smaller in absolute value.  Time from crisis 
onset appears to matter equally for aid disbursements, whether or not the crisis has "officially" 
ended (as coded by CKLN).  This finding is consistent with the finding, discussed below, that the 
fiscal effects of crisis linger long after the bank bailouts have ended.   
Equation 3 of Table 3 includes the non-systemic crises coded by CKLN, in addition to the LV 
systemic crises, more than doubling the number of crises in the sample.  This change does nothing 
to reduce the estimated depth of the crisis-induced fall in aid, and in fact deepens it somewhat by 
reducing the coefficient on the quadratic term (and hence weakening the eventual rebound in aid).   
Including non-systemic crises expands the number of donors with multiple crises over our sample 
period, thus introducing more noise into our crisis variables, which count up from the onset of the 
first crisis.  We therefore in equation 4 drop the four countries (Turkey, Iceland, UK, and US) with 
multiple crises.  Point estimates on the crisis variables change very little, but significance weakens 
with this one-sixth reduction in the sample size.  
To summarize, banking crises reduce predicted aid by perhaps 20 to 25 percent below trend, with 
the largest effect coming only about 10 years after crisis onset.  Moreover, it is likely that the 
relationship is a causal one, flowing from financial-sector troubles to reduced aid.  It is implausible 
that future reductions in aid outflows trigger banking crises, of course.  And while it is theoretically 
possible that an omitted third variable (such as unbridled greed, or poor executive governance) 
could cause both banking crises and aid reductions several years after the crisis, we find this unlikely.  
In the case of the current downturn, for example, the Bush Administration had increased aid 
substantially even as the conditions for a financial crisis were gathering.  
Effects of donor-country income levels 
As expected, the level of per-capita income (in logs) of a donor country is a strong, robust, and very 
significant predictor of the amount of ODA that the country gives each year.  In the Table 1 
regressions predicting disbursements, we find that the coefficient on log GDP per capita is   14
persistently about 3.1 or 3.2.  Even when other economic control variables are added (in Table 4 
below), the coefficient on income usually varies only from about 2.8 to 4.2.   
These fixed-effects estimates are substantially higher than OLS coefficients (not shown), probably 
because of omitted variable bias.  Most notably, the United States, one of the highest-income 
donors, has historically given less aid relative to its income than most other OECD countries, for 
reasons that clearly have little to do with the slope of the aid-income relationship.  To some extent, 
control variables such as the trade/GDP and fiscal deficit/GDP ratios may capture these 
unobserved variables, and we include those in the later regressions.  But because heterogeneity in 
unobservables is likely to be important as well, the fixed-effects results are likely to be the most 
illuminating. 
Because the dependent variable is also in logs, this coefficient on income can be interpreted as an 
elasticity, implying that a 1 percent increase in GDP per capita is associated with an increase of 
about 3 percent in aid outflows.  To gauge the reasonableness of this finding, consider what it 
implies for aid shares in GDP.  With an elasticity of 3, a decade of steady per-capita income growth 
of 1 percent per year (with no population growth) would raise a donor country’s aid/GDP ratio 
from 0.35 percent to 0.43 percent.
8   
Given that the incomes of donor countries have grown consistently over recent decades, why do the 
data not show the steady increase in aid/GDP ratios predicted by these results?  From an 
econometric perspective, a major reason is that over much of the 1977-2007 period, the coefficients 
on the year dummies were consistently shrinking, indicating a secular decline in average propensity for 
aid-giving that partially offset the tendency toward higher aid-giving associated with higher donor 
incomes.  The post-1990 decline has been attributed in part to the end of the Cold War, which 
reduced the geopolitical motivation for aid-giving.  Since the late 1990s, however, the year dummies 
suggest that this secular decline has leveled off.   
                                                 
8 We also re-ran the regressions with aid/GDP as the dependent variable.  In those cases, the coefficient on log GDP 
per capita was typically on the order of 0.004.  From an initial average aid/GDP share of .0035, say, this translates into 
an increase of a little more than 1 percent in the aid share with 1 percent income growth.   This coefficient magnitude is 
very similar to those reported by Round and Odedokun (2004).   15
The result that donor-country income is a significant and quantitatively important predictor of aid is 
consistent with findings of some other recent studies (Round and Odedokun 2004; Boschini and 
Olofsgard 2007; Chong and Gradstein 2008).   Our elasticity estimates are much larger than those 
reported by Boschini and Olofsgard, which range only from .47 to .62 in their various specifications.  
(The difference is explained largely by the fact that Boschini and Olofsgard control for lagged aid; 
when we do this with our specifications, the elasticity drops to about 0.8, which is not very different 
from their result.)  Note that our results on income are not particularly sensitive to the indicator of 
aid that we use.     
While we focus primarily on the banking-crisis and income variables, we also include population (in 
logs) as a control variable in the core regressions in Table 1.  Perhaps surprisingly, population is 
rarely a significant predictor of aid disbursements in our fixed-effects specifications, in either this 
table or subsequent ones.  In OLS regressions (not shown here), where estimates are informed by 
cross-country variation in the data, population is a stronger predictor of aid outflows.  But over time 
for a given donor, years with higher population are not associated with significantly higher aid 
disbursements.
9  Overall our results indicate that donor-country population changes matter far less 
than per-capita income changes as determinants of aid.
10   
Correlations with other economic variables 
In addition to income levels, several other possible economic determinants of aid have been 
examined in the literature:  size of government, budget surplus or deficit, unemployment rate, 
inflation rate, real exchange rate, and trade exposure.  In Table 4, we enter each of these in turn.  
Given the focus of this paper, the most important insight is that none of the other economic 
variables substantially reduce the size (in absolute value) of the banking-crisis coefficients.  In the 
                                                 
9 This result is consistent with Boschini and Olofsgard (2007).  Log of population is negative and significant in Round 
and Odedokun (2004), who use aid/GDP as their dependent variable.  These studies all use donor fixed effects, so they 
are not merely showing that aid is low relative to GDP in the most populous donors, the U.S. and Japan.  With aid per 
capita as the dependent variable in our tests, the effect of population is significantly negative (results available on 
request).  Frot (2009) uses aid per capita but does not include population among his regressors.  
10 Thus, even though aggregate GDP is a good predictor of aid levels (in regressions that are not shown here), the 
elasticity of aid with respect to GDP is not constant.  Its magnitude will depend on whether income has increased as a 
result of population growth or growth in per-capita income.  A corollary is that the current downturn in OECD 
economies may have larger negative effects on aid than would a downturn of equivalent size caused by a fall in 
population growth (to suggest an unrealistic thought experiment).   16
only notable change in point estimates, when unemployment is introduced (in equation 3), the 
coefficient on the linear counter variable increases in absolute value, i.e. becomes even more 
negative.  Unemployment is strongly correlated with per capita income, however, and when we test 
unemployment without income as a regression (equation 4), the coefficient falls back to its usual 
range of a 4 to 5 percent annual decline and loses significance.
11   
Most of these economic variables are strongly significant predictors of aid, although not always in 
the expected direction.  Perhaps surprisingly, the share of government expenditures in GDP is not 
significant (equation 1).  The lagged budget surplus is negatively associated with aid disbursements 
(equation 2).  Despite lagging budget surplus by a year, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
surpluses are achieved by cutting aid along with many other spending categories.  This would be 
consistent with Faini’s (2006) finding that a larger public-sector debt is associated with lower aid, if 
debt necessitates budget surpluses
12.  In any event, the effect quantitatively is quite small.   
Unemployment is positively correlated with disbursements (equation 3) when income is also included 
in the regression but this counterintuitive result disappears when income is omitted (equation 4).  
Higher inflation is associated with lower aid disbursements in equation 5.
13  A stronger domestic currency 
is associated with higher aid (equation 6).  Contrary to the evidence from bilateral trade relationships 
(Boschini and Olofsgard 2007),  greater openness as measured by trade share/GDP (equation 7) is not 
a significant predictor of aid flows.  
                                                 
11 Unemployment data are unavailable for many countries in the earlier part of our sample period, so we lose one-sixth 
of our observations when unemployment is included in our regressions.   
12 We tried testing directly the hypothesis that debt stocks could explain aid disbursements, by including a measure of 
debt stock/GDP from the OECD.  There are a lot of missing observations on debt stocks from our 24 donors, 
however, and so including that variable cost us over one-fifth of our observations (although we still ended up with 
substantially more than Faini’s analysis did).  The coefficient did not prove significant, nor did it significantly affect the 
estimated coefficients on the banking crisis, per-capita income, or budget surplus variables.   
13 Mendoza, Jones and Vergara (2009) show that U.S. aid over time is inversely related to a “misery index” equal to the 
inflation rate plus the unemployment rate.  They do not test them separately.  Nor do they offer a theoretical justification 
for their assumption that a percentage point increase in unemployment has the same impact on aid as a percentage point 
increase in the inflation rate.       17
Correlations with political variables 
Table 5 shows the effects of including other variables that are political in nature or thought to work 
primarily through the political process.  The first is inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
which Chong and Gradstein (2008) find is a significant predictor of lower aid but other studies have 
not found to be significant.  Equation 1 confirms Chong and Gradstein’s result, with the coefficient 
point estimate implying a Gini increase of 5 points – roughly the rise in earnings inequality in the US 
between 1985 and 2000 – is associated with a 15 percent fall in aid.  The relationship could be 
causal, if higher inequality makes it harder to justify spending resources to reduce poverty in other 
countries.  Alternatively, both higher inequality and lower aid could reflect underlying shifts in the 
electorate’s willingness to spend for poverty alleviation anywhere.   
Having less corruption (as measured by ICRG, with a higher index indicating less corruption) also 
predicts higher aid, and the effect is large:  a one-point increase in the corruption index increases 
predicted aid by 12 percentage points (equation 2).  This finding is also consistent with results in 
Chong and Calderon (2008), who argue that the corruption index proxies for voter attitudes 
regarding their government’s competence to spend resources effectively.  However, in our 
regressions the coefficient is not significant.  Nor are the coefficients on variables capturing the 
political leanings of the party in government (as coded by Beck et al. (2001)); this non-result is 
consistent with the findings from the other studies in the literature (Round and Odedokun 2004; 
Boschini and Olofsgard 2007; Chong and Gradstein 2008; Mendoza, Jones, and Vergara 2009).
14 
Again, the most important result from these analyses is that including these variables does not 
challenge the main conclusions from earlier tables.  Overall, the key banking-crisis dummy remains 
highly negative and statistically significant, albeit somewhat less so in columns 1 and 3.
15   
                                                 
14 Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) also find no evidence that government ideology 
matters.  Chong and Calderon (2008) similarly test leftist governments against all others, finding no significant result in 
fixed effects regressions similar to ours, but a positive effect in dynamic panel data regressions.   
15 The sample in equation 3 is missing data for Switzerland, which had a four-party ruling coalition over the whole 
period that spanned the left-right spectrum.  France, Portugal and Turkey are also missing observations for a few years 
on the party ideology classifications.      18
Interpreting the crisis results 
What drives these large banking crisis effects on aid?  As noted earlier, one likely channel is the 
major fiscal costs of crises.   Aid is forced to compete with other priorities, most of them with larger 
domestic constituencies, as aid to the financial sector and other expenditures necessitated by the 
crisis crowd out pre-crisis spending.  Articles on aid spending in crisis countries show this effect in 
action.  In the years after the S&L bailout in the United States, Lancaster (2006) notes that   “. . .new 
purposes . . . were not enough to protect foreign aid -- especially development aid -- from being 
slashed during the efforts of the 1990s to cut the federal budget deficit and the size of government.”  
Similar pressures restrained Japan’s aid in the early 2000s, as suggested by this quote from 2003:  
“Japan has relied heavily on aid to project influence overseas. But it has been forced to scale back on 
this diplomatic clout by a fiscal crisis that will see public debt soar to ¥686 trillion at the end of this 
fiscal year” (Watts 2003).  In the current global crisis, conflicting needs are already putting aid 
budgets under pressure; for example, the Financial Times reported in July 2009 that “in 2009 Italian 
aid administered by the foreign ministry is being cut by 56 per cent” (Peel 2009).  And aid is being 
forced to compete with domestic programs for those in need:  as Ireland cut its aid budget 
substantially in 2008 and 2009, newspapers noted that leading development campaigner Bob Geldof 
“refused to condemn the cuts”, citing “ ‘people in this country who are seriously hurt by this current 
malaise’ ” (Cunningham 2009).   
A natural follow-up question is why banking crises should have their most severe effects on aid only 
in the medium to long term.  The negative effects on aid do appear to start soon after the crisis hits, 
as suggested by both the raw data in Figure 1 and the regression results, as well as the example from 
Ireland given above.  But according to our analysis, the effects continue to deepen (relative to 
counterfactual) for 7 to 10 years, which seems remarkably long.   
Recent analysis of the effects of banking crises by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) suggest a possible 
explanation.  That paper finds that major banking crisis have effects on growth and fiscal positions 
that are especially large and long-lasting.  In particular, they cause a major shock to government 
revenue, which flips from rising at an average rate of 3 percent per year in the years immediately 
before the crisis to declining at about 3 percent in the first three years of the crisis.  At the same 
time, governments must pay not only for the banking-sector bailouts – the full cost of which are not 
typically known for years – but also other expenditures needed to address the economic effects of   19
the crisis.  As a result, public debt increases by a daunting 86 percent on average in the first 3 years 
of crisis.   Reinhart and Rogoff conclude that “[a]rguably, the true legacy of banking crises is higher 
public indebtedness—far over and beyond the direct headline costs of big bailout packages.”   
Given the size of the debt overhang, it is quite plausible that debt pressures lead governments to cut 
back or at least restrain growth in aid for years afterwards, as suggested by Faini’s (2006) finding that 
a larger public sector debt predicts lower aid levels.  And in fact, the US and Japanese examples cited 
above both refer to aid cutbacks that took place five years or more after banking crises hit, during a 
period of attempts to deal with the debt legacy.  In the case of Sweden, an OECD development co-
operation review from 1996 – five years after that county’s banking crisis broke out – makes this link 
explicitly as it explains the recent fall in ODA:  “Because of budget deficits Sweden has embarked 
on a stringent budget cutting exercise to definitively halt the large deficits of recent years and reverse 
the serious buildup in public debt”, leading the OECD to expect “a further large fall in [aid] 
disbursements” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1996). 
4. Implications for aid in a time of global financial crisis (and beyond) 
What do these results on income and banking-crisis effects imply for the likely path of aid 
disbursements over the next decade?  Past is not necessarily prologue, particularly given the 
unprecedented magnitude of the current crisis.  And without a fully worked-out general equilibrium 
model, we cannot credibly estimate the joint effects of the numerous variables that we have 
identified as significant predictors of aid flows.  Nevertheless, we can learn something by tracing out 
the joint effects of the income and banking-crisis variables, both of which have large and 
consistently significant effects.  
Consider a stylized version of a country moving along a crisis and recession path like that of the 
United States, starting with the short-term effects on aid.  In 2009, according to the IMF (2009c), 
US GDP is estimated to have fallen 2.6 percent compared with 2008.  But this is only a portion of 
the relevant income loss.  To understand the effects on aid relative to the counterfactual, we have to 
estimate what would have happened to income in the absence of a crisis.  Assume that GDP growth 
would have continued through 2010 at its 2007 growth rate of 2.0 percent, instead of falling to 1.1, -
2.6, and 0.8 percent as projected by the IMF.  Then as a result of the crisis, by 2010 per-capita 
incomes (assuming no significant effects on population) will be about 6 percent below where they   20
would have been in the absence of the downturn.  If the aid-income elasticities of 2 to 3 operate 
cyclically the way they do in the long-term panel regressions, then this could imply aid levels 12 to 18 
percent below the counterfactual.  At the same time, the banking crisis coefficient estimates from 
Table 1 imply a fall of perhaps 11 percent relative to the counterfactual.  Three years into the crisis, 
then, the combined effect of the per-capita income and banking crisis variables could therefore keep 
aid 20 to 30 percent below where it would have been otherwise.   
Over the longer term, the situation may not improve for some time despite the expected economic 
recovery.  GDP should eventually return to its potential as the economy comes out of recession, but 
based on the experience of past crises, the IMF expects the annual growth rate of potential output to 
fall by 0.5 percent as a result of this crisis (International Monetary Fund 2009b).  The authors 
therefore project GDP to be nearly 6 percent lower in 2014 than it would have been in the absence 
of the crisis, and they note that this estimate is within the range suggested by the literature on 
banking crises and growth.
16  Again, this 6 percent lost output could translate into aid levels 12 to 18 
percent below the counterfactual.  However, seven years after the crisis hit, our estimates suggest 
that the banking-crisis effect will have grown rather than attenuated.  The point estimates from the 
quadratic specification suggest a drop in aid of 20 percent after 7 years, a figure that is consistent 
with the coefficient on the dummy from the intervals estimate in later regressions.  Thus after seven 
years, the combined effects of the financial crisis through these two channels could be to reduce aid 
by some 30 percent or more relative to the counterfactual.   
These estimated aid effects are very rough, and they do not take into account the effects of other 
determinants that will also be shifting and that will offset each other.  In the short term, for example, 
the crisis has already led to higher budget deficits and lower inflation relative to trend, both of which 
are associated with higher aid; but it has also led to higher unemployment, higher inequality, and a 
lower trade share, all of which are associated with lower aid.  Since we do not jointly estimate these 
effects, these casual simulations should not be interpreted too literally.  The point is that, especially 
in the donor countries that have suffered financial crises (including the US, UK, Ireland, and 
Iceland), aid could fall well below the counterfactual and remain lower for the next decade.  And in 
some of these countries, the effects on aid could be larger than in the stylized case considered above, 
                                                 
16 By contrast, after a “normal” recession growth would likely have returned to the original potential output path.  This is 
an important way in which this financial-crisis-induced recession will differ from other recessions in its effects on aid.   21
because the crisis effects are more severe.  In the case of Ireland, for example, the IMF estimates 
that GDP will drop more than 13 percent from 2008 through 2010, and that even in 2014 the 
potential GDP growth rate will not have recovered to its pre-crisis level (International Monetary 
Fund 2009a).   
One caution is that this analysis does not take into account any possible strategic interactions among 
donors.   The economic fluctuations and banking crises between 1977 and 2007 tended to affect 
smaller groups of countries, whereas this time the macroeconomic downturn and banking crises are 
highly synchronized across countries.  This synchronization could either exacerbate or dampen the 
effects of crisis on aid, depending on the strategic interactions among donor countries.  Imagine that 
the standard approach of the aid community in the past has been for donors to compensate for each 
other in the case of economic shocks – that is, for one donor to increase its aid when another is 
forced to cut back in a recession.  In that case, the effect on aggregate aid of a downturn in one 
country would be less than the effect on that country’s own aid.  But with the synchronized global 
recessions this time around, there may be no donor-of-last-resort that is willing to step in and 
compensate for shortfalls elsewhere, so aid could drop farther than predicted.  Alternatively, if 
donor countries become concerned about the dangers of simultaneous cutback in aid across many 
countries, they may be able to coordinate to maintain aid above the levels that would otherwise 
emerge from their unilateral decisionmaking.  In that case, aggregate aid would not drop by as much 
as predicted. 
5. Conclusions 
Using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 and 2007, the results presented above show 
that banking crises in donor countries are associated with substantial declines in aid flows.   Even 
after controlling for income and other factors, net ODA disbursements from crisis-affected 
countries fall by an average of 20 to 25 percent (relative to the counterfactual) and bottom out only 
about a decade after the onset of the banking crisis.  One possible channel for this effect is 
governments’ attempts to deal with the large fiscal debt overhangs that typically result from banking 
crises.  Our results also confirm that donor-country per capita income is strongly related to aid 
flows, with an elasticity of about 3.   
   22
What is the relevance of these findings to the current situation?  If aid flows follow historical 
patterns, the current global financial crisis could reduce aid significantly over the medium term (at 
least relative to counterfactual).  All donor countries are suffering from the current global recession, 
driving their incomes down sharply.  And there are several donors that are suffering banking crises 
or severe strains on their banking systems – clearly the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Ireland, which together accounted for a third of DAC aid in 2008, and potentially also other 
significant donors such as Spain (Bjork 2009).  Historical patterns suggest that aid from these 
countries could fall by a fifth to a quarter in the coming years, in relative terms, as they wrestle with 
the fiscal and other consequences of banking-sector stresses.    
Because we have focused on donor aid-giving behavior, rather than on the effects of aid on recipient 
countries, this analysis has made no assumptions about the effectiveness of aid in spurring growth 
and poverty reduction.  Whether aid works, and in what conditions, has been the subject of 
considerable debate within the economics profession and outside.  In our view, the question of 
whether aid yields significantly positive returns during and immediately after a major global recession 
is likely to be quite different than the general question about aid effectiveness.  Most developing 
countries are being hit hard by the global recession, with net private debt and equity inflows 
plummeting by three-quarters in just two years (World Bank 2009)  This constitutes a major 
exogenous shock, one that is hitting even countries that have managed their economies well.  There 
are strong reasons to believe that aid that has the effect of tiding government over during the crisis 
could improve welfare significantly, by dampening welfare-reducing fluctuations in consumption or 
investment.  Aid for such purposes seems unlikely to damage long-run governance or tax effort.  Or, 
to turn it around, a drop in aid as a result of the donor-country recessions and banking crises would 
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Dev.   Min.   Max. 
 
Net disbursements (constant 2007 $mil)   3359 4041 8.04  29611
Net aid transfers (constant 2007 $mil )   2802 3398 -333.8  24286
Gross disbursements (constant 2007 $mil)  3830 4677 11.78  30475
GDP per capita (2007 $)  25253 10417 3943  67110
Population (millions)  38.4 57.2 0.258  302
Trade share of GDP (%)  72.1 43.8 16.1  326.6
Government spending (% of GDP)  26.2 11.8 10.1  63.0
Surplus/deficit (% of GDP)  -2.2 4.3 -16.8  18.5
Unemployment rate (% of labor force)  7.0 3.9 1.5  23.9
Inflation  rate (%)  4.4 4.1 -3.8  24.7
Real exchange rate  105.2 13.0 54.9  145.9
Inequality (Gini coefficient)  29.0 5.5 19.7  43.9
Corruption (0 worst, 6 best, from ICRG)  4.9 1.1 2  6
Leftist ruling party (0-1 dummy)  0.38 0.48 0  1
Rightist ruling party (0-1 dummy)  0.47 0.50 0  1
No. years from start of systemic crisis   2.3 5.6 0  31














Number of years from crisis start  ‐0.044** ‐0.039** ‐0.042*   
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)   
Number of years from crisis start squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002**   
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)   
Dummy for first six years from crisis start           0.015
           (0.126)
Dummy for years 7‐13 from crisis start           ‐0.300*
           (0.158)
Dummy for years 14 and higher from crisis start           ‐0.029
           (0.227)
Log per capita income  3.143*** 3.200*** 3.166***  3.200***
  (0.698) (0.162) (0.703)  (0.717)
Log population  ‐0.350 ‐0.612 0.629  ‐0.279
  (1.271) (1.329) (1.413)  (1.280)
R
2  .96  .96  .96  .96 
No. of donors  24 24 24  24
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squared 




No. of years 
squared 
       
1) Iceland dropped (very small donor)  ‐0.043** 0.002***    
  (0.018) (0.0005)    
2) Finland dropped (largest aid decline) ‐0.045** 0.002***    
  (0.019) (0.0005)    
3) Korea dropped (new donor)  ‐0.051*** 0.002***    
  (0.017) (0.0005)    
4) Japan crisis start date changed to 1992  ‐0.045** 0.002***    
  (0.017) (0.0005)    
5) USA crisis (1988‐91) coded as non‐systemic  ‐0.033* 0.002***    
  (0.018) (0.0005)    
6) Spain dropped (earliest crisis)  ‐0.049* 0.002*    
  (0.026) (0.001)    
7) Turkey dropped (multiple crises)    ‐0.040** 0.002***    





  (0.017) (0.0004)    
9) Variables for 2
nd crisis added  ‐0.040* 0.002***  ‐0.019 0.013*
  (0.017) (0.0004)  (0.066) (0.007)
10) multilateral contributions excluded ‐0.051* 0.002***    
  (0.019) (0.0007)    
 
Dependent variable is log of net ODA disbursements.  Note *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01.  All regressions 
control for per capita income, population, and country and year effects. Standard errors are adjusted 

























Number of years from crisis start  ‐0.041** ‐0.041** ‐0.044**  ‐0.040*
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.020)
Number of years from crisis start squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*  0.001
  (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)  (0.001)
No. of years from start of ongoing crisis       ‐0.005    
      (0.030)    
No. of years squared from start of ongoing crisis       0.001    
      (0.001)    
Log per capita income  3.203*** 3.140*** 2.810***  2.843***
  (0.745) (0.706) (0.652)  (0.672)
Log population  ‐0.354 ‐0.444 0.369  0.076
  (1.291) (1.287) (1.109)  (1.300)
R
2  .97  .97  .97  .95 
No. of donors  24 24 24  20









Equation  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of years from crisis start  ‐0.038** ‐0.048*** ‐0.080***  ‐0.047 ‐0.039*** ‐0.036** ‐0.037**
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)  (0.036) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018)
Number of years from crisis start squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***  0.002* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)  (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Log per capita income  3.215*** 3.391*** 4.193***     3.126*** 2.878*** 2.963***
  (0.697) (0.660) (0.630)     (0.716) (0.686) (0.752)
Log population  ‐0.267 0.061 ‐0.976  0.208 ‐0.179 ‐0.202 ‐0.615
  (1.338) (1.480) (1.588)  (2.965) (1.194) (1.260) (1.288)
Lagged gov. exp. as a share of GDP  0.003                  
  (0.003)                     
Lagged budget surplus/deficit (% of GDP)   ‐0.023**           
    (0.009)           
Unemployment rate     0.044***  ‐0.012    
     (0.008)  (0.033)    
Inflation rate       ‐0.031**   
       (0.017)   
Real exchange rate (USA 2000 = 100)       0.008***  
        (0.001)  
Trade share of GDP            0.003
            (0.004)
R
2  .96  .97  .97  .95  .97  .97  .96 
No. of donors  24 24 24  24 23 22 24






Equation  1 2 3 
          
Number of years from crisis start ‐0.034* ‐0.041**  ‐0.026*
  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.015)
Number of years from crisis start squared 0.002*** 0.002***  0.002***
  (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0004)
Log per capita income  3.188*** 3.002***  ‐0.201
  (0.760) (0.563)  (1.085)
Log population  ‐0.812 0.101  ‐0.026*
  (1.300) (1.498)  (0.015)
Inequality (Gini coefficient)  ‐0.031*   
  (0.018)   
Corruption index (ICRG, 0‐6 scale)   0.125   






2  .96  .97  .97
No. of donors  23 24  23 
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Figure 2 
Impact of Banking Crises on Net Disbursed Aid  
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